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The Foreign Arnici Dilemma 
Stephen A.  lass* 
Lately, a great deal of academic commentary has been 
devoted to the Supreme Court's international interpretive 
work.' Writings consistently highlight the Court's failure to 
use accepted rules, principles, or canons of construction when 
interpreting treaties or statutes affecting foreign governments 
and nationals. The Court's work product, which generally 
reflects a routine adoption of the executive's interpretation, 
variously has been termed "bankr~pt"~  and "monstr~us."~ 
This criticism of the Court's foreign interpretive efforts is a 
bit surprising in view. of the ongoing absence of intelligible 
principles in much of the Court's domestic statutory 
construction work. Local Court watchers and critics recognize, 
however, that fidelity to neutral principles is not an 
interpretive cornerstone for the CourL4 Consequently, 
* Stephen A. Plass, Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. 
1. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons And Treaty Interpretation, 41 
UCLA L. REV. 953 (1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Reflections On Refoulement And 
Haitian Centers Council, 35 HAW. INT'L L.J. 1 (1994) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS]; 
Harold Hongju Koh, The "Haiti Paradigm" in United States Human Rights Policy, 
103 YALE L.J. 2391 (1994) [hereinafter HAITI PARADIGM]; Jordan J. Paust, After 
Alvarez-Machain, Abduction, Standing, Denials of Justice, and Unaddressed Human 
Rights Claims, 67 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 551 (1993); Herman de J. Ruiz-Bravo, 
Monstrous Decision: Kidnapping is Legal, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 833 (1993); 
Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in  the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 185 (1993). 
2. Bederman, supra note 1, at 954. 
3. Jonathan Bush, How Did We Get Here? Foreign Abduction After Alvarez- 
Machain, 45 STAN. L. REV. 939, 943 (1993). Justice Stevens previously made this 
observation in Alvarez-Machain. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 
655, 687 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I suspect most courts throughout the 
civilized world-will be deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision the Court 
announces today."). 
4. As examples, see Hans W. Boade, "Original Intent" in Historical 
Perspective: Some Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001 (1991); Kevin R. Johnson, 
Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch 
Primacy Over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413 (1993); Vincent Di Lorenzo, A 
Fixed Principle Approach to Statutory Construction: The Glass-Steagall Act as a 
Test Case, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1285; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The 
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academics live with the frustrations of politicized decision 
making while searching for analytical strategies that bring 
coherence to the Court's work and effectuate congressional 
intent.5 
The primary goal of this article is to go beyond the "rule of 
deferencev6 theory and explore how and why the Court 
routinely rejects or ignores the interpretations offered by 
foreigners when their views conflict with those of the executive. 
By exposing the imbalance and unfairness of the Court's 
approach, perhaps this article will open the door for remedial 
measures. 
This article does not provide an exhaustive historical 
analysis of Supreme Court response to amici efforts, but rather 
sets out several historical spotlights which illuminate the 
futility of foreign arnici. This illumination is accomplished by 
exploring three different types of amici "picketing": (1) purely 
domestic, (2) domestic-foreign, and (3) purely foreign. The term 
"amici picketing" refers both to formal brief submission as well 
as extra-judicial activities intended to influence the Court. 
Canons of Statutory Construction and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647 
(1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An 
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 749 (1995). 
5. The primary mechanism for reining in the Court after statutory detours is 
the congressional override. Initial popular outcry often crystallizes into concrete 
advocacy which serves as a catalyst for congresspersons to introduce legislation 
designed to overturn the Court's interpretation. The civil rights area is a constant 
battlefield for the Court and Congress as evidenced by repeated congressional 
overrulings of the Court's construction of civil rights statutes. For a discussion of 
the ongoing battle between Congress and the Court, see Eric Schnapper, Statutory 
Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1095 (1993). 
Another strategy used to avoid a harmful meaning assigned by the Court is to 
litigate the issue before a judge who does not share the Court's view. For example, 
in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Court ruled that 
an employment discrimination plaintiff is not entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law if he proves a prima facie case and also proves that the employer's defense 
was a total fabrication. Id. at  2747-48. The Court interpreted Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, as requiring that 
the employee show not only that the employer was lying, but that the lies were 
intended to hide discrimination. However, the Hicks decision conceded that proof 
from the prima facie case and proof that the employer's reason is incredible "may" 
in some instances be sufficient to support a judgment for the employee. Id. a t  
2749. This "loophole* gives judges who do not believe in the pretext-plus rule an 
opportunity to rule for the employee without evidence that the real motivation for 
the employer's decision was prohibited discriminatory animus. 
6. See Bederman, supra note 1, a t  960-61, 1015-16 (noting that the rule of 
deference is ingrained and has been taken to new heights by the Rehnquist Court). 
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First, the article looks at  a scenario of purely domestic 
protest and amici brief submission, noting this approach's 
political nature, high costs and limited benefits. This inquiry is 
fleshed out in a discussion of the Court's response to domestic 
amici in statutory interpretation cases. The article traces the 
Court's intermittent accountability when interpreting domestic 
legislation to the integration of amici in the tripartite 
democratic structure-a status foreign amici are unable to 
achieve. Because foreign constituencies do not have access to 
the democratic processes that help make the Court 
ac~ountable,~ and because the American public seldom cares 
about an executive interpretation that adversely affects 
foreigners, principled construction becomes a weak weapon to 
use in attacking the Court's rule of deference to the executive. 
This article concludes that domestic protest and amicus 
brief submissions have the most influence over the Court. But 
even this approach has its limitations because it  tends to be 
temporary, especially when the Court is particularly activist. 
Second, this article uses the Haitian refugee cases to 
demonstrate the results that occur when the efforts of domestic 
and foreign constituencies coalesce in exerting pressure on the 
Court. The article concludes that this second approach will 
more likely get the executive's attention, but will have little or 
no effect on the Court. 
Third, this article considers the effectiveness of purely 
foreign extrajudicial and amici pressure, showing that this 
approach is the least beneficial and is typically received with 
judicial indifference. Because foreign critics have never been 
able to impugn the Court's institutional legitimacy in any 
meaningful way,8 the article concludes that focus on the 
7. At the outset, Congress' role in treaty creation and interpretation is 
limited. Participation in the process is limited to the Senate, US. CONST. art  11, 
8 2, and senatorial interpretations are given little weight. See Bederman, supra 
note 1, a t  959. In any event, a t  the treaty-making stage, congressional focus is on 
promoting national interests, not advocating for non-constituency foreign states. See 
James C. Wolf, Comment, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1023, 1058 (1988) (Senators rarely hear views of foreign treaty 
parties and rely heavily on the executive when voting). Further, influence buying 
through financial contributions is not an option for foreign nationals because they 
are statutorily barred from doing so. See 2 U.S.C. 9 441(e) (1994); see also, Turley, 
supra note 1, a t  250 (foreign interests must turn to the executive because Congress 
is not readily accessible). 
8. Although dismay can be found in narrow academic circles when the 
Court's treaty construction is unprincipled, the outcry is never as widespread or 
heartfelt as when the Court botches domestic legislation. It could be that, like the 
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Court's interpretive methodology is misplaced. Absent an 
internal political mechanism that triggers popular American 
outcry, the Court will likely remain insulated fkom, and 
indifferent to, foreign amici. 
Applying public or political pressure on the United States 
Supreme Court in order to shape its deliberations is 
commonplace. Extrajudicial pressure tactics include marches, 
mail, academic commentary, or even such radical 
demonstrations as publicly displaying a fetus in a b ~ t t l e . ~  
Attempts to influence are particularly notable when the Court 
is adjudicating sensitive constitutional cases. While the Court 
is theoretically insulated from political forces,1° there is 
weighty evidence that such strategies sometimes influence 
outcomes." In fact, there is evidence that the Justices 
sometimes write opinions designed to incite public response, so 
as to mold future interpretive deliberations.12 
Another common form of potential influence on the Court 
is amicus briefs.13 Such briefs are a prescribed part of the 
Court's adjudicative mechanism,14 and are often preceded and 
backed by public outcry. In constitutional and statutory 
Court, most American scholars react to treaty language with aloofness, and have a 
default rule of deference to both the executive and judiciary. A good part of the 
explanation, however, probably lies in self-interest, in the sense that the American 
populace and critics have no stake in challenging decisions that aggrandize 
"American" privileges. 
9. See Robert F. Nagel, Political Pressure and Judging in Constitutional 
Cases, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 685 (1990). 
10. Richard Delgado, Judicial Influences and the Inside-Outside Dichotomy: A 
Comment On Professor Nagel, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 711 (1990); Larry G. Simon, 
The Supreme Court's Independence: Accountability, Majoritarianism, and 
Justifiation, Comments on Seidman, 61 S. C&. L. REV. 1607 (1988). 
11. See Nagel, supra note 9, at  697 ("[M]onumental civil rights decisions were 
not the product of Justices oblivious to people in the streets."). 
12. Professor Nagel offers as examples Justice Blackmuds dissent in the 
abortion case Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 537 (1989) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Justice RRhnquistYs dissent in the flag burning case 
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Nagel, 
supra note 9, at 687-89. 
13. For a discussion of the origins and development of amicus curiae, see 
Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief- From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE 
L.J. 694 (1963); Michael K. Lowman, Comment, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: 
When Does the Party Begin After the Friends Leave, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243 
(1992). 
14. See Sup. Ct. R. 37. 
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interpretation cases, domestic amici have sometimes had 
persuasive impact on the Court.'' Patterson v. McClean Credit 
~ n i o n ' ~  offers some good insights into how local protest filters 
through our domestic processes and affects judicial conclusions. 
A. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union 
Patterson is a good example of the influence of domestic 
amici on the Court's interpretive choices. At issue in Patterson 
was a civil rights statute, 5 1981, which provides that: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall 
have the same right in every State and Territory to make and 
enforce contracts, t o  sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the 
fidl and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the 
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citi- 
zens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal- 
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no 
other. l7 
Brenda Patterson sued her employer under this provision 
alleging racial harassment on the job. The district court dis- 
missed her complaint, finding that § 1981 does not police racial 
harassment while employed. The court of appeals agreed, find- 
ing that § 1981 regulates only the right to make and enforce 
contracts, not terms and conditions of empl~yment.'~ The Su- 
preme Court agreed to hear the case in order to determine 
whether it should extend Runyon v. McCrary'slg prohibition of 
private contractual discrimination to on-the-job discrimination. 
In 1976, the Court had decided in Runyon that 5 1981 prohibits 
discrimination by private bodies." 
The Court heard arguments in Patterson in February 1988. 
However, a short time later it ordered the parties to reargue 
the case, this time requesting that they address the question of 
15. See, e.g., Susan Hedman, Friends of the Earth and Friends of the Court: 
Assessing the Impact of Interest Group Amici Curiae in  Environmental Cases 
Decided by the Supreme Court, 10 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 187 (1991); David S. Ruder, 
Address, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The 
SEC Experience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167. 
16. 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994). 
17. 42 U.S.C. 8 1981(a) (1988). 
18. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 805 F.2d 1143, 1145 (4th Cir. 1986) 
afPd in  part, vacated in  part, 491 U.S. 164 (1994), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 (1994). 
19. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
20. Id. at 171-74. 
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whether the Runyon Court's interpretation of 9 1981 was cor- 
rect. The decision to test the legitimacy of Runyon triggered a 
firestorm of criticism from many segments of American soci- 
e t ~ . ~ '  After all, neither party to the lawsuit had questioned 
the legality of Runyon and that issue was not before the Court. 
Congress as well as civil rights, labor, and religious groups, 
among others, saw this move by the Court as an attempt by 
conservative Justices to roll back important civil rights protec- 
tion; these groups filed amicus briefs with the Court arguing 
that Runyon was correctly decided.22 The briefs apparently 
influenced the Court as evidenced by its ruling that even if 
Runyon was not correctly decided, stare decisis supported def- 
erence to its interpretation that $ 1981 prohibits private dis- 
~riminat ion.~~ The Court stated that: "Whether Runyon's in- 
terpretation of $ 1981 as prohibiting racial discrimination in 
the making and enforcement of private contracts is right or 
wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is not inconsis- 
tent with the prevailing sense of justice in this c0unt1-y."~~ 
The influence of amici in Patterson can hardly be overstat- 
ed. In Patterson the Court interpreted 5 1981 as not prohibiting 
on-the-job discrimination although the language of the statute 
is susceptible to such a constru~tion.~~ In addition, the Court 
21. See Reginald C. Govan, Framing Issues and Acquiring Codes: An Overview 
of the Legislative Sojourn of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057, 
1063 (1992) ("That request by the Supreme Court unleashed a firestorm of opposi- 
tion from Congress, religious groups, and the civil rights and labor communities, 
all of whom filed amicus briefs essentially saying to the Court, 'Don't you dare.'" 
(footnote omitted)); Barbara L. Kramer, Comment, Runyon Reconsidered: The Fu- 
ture of Section 1981 as a Basis for Employment Discrimination Claims, 38 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 251, 268 n.178 (1990) ("No one could have expected the organized 
outcry generated by the order. By early June, a coalition of 112 civic groups, 47 
state attorneys general, 66 U.S. senators, and 118 members of the House of Repre- 
sentatives were preparing amicus briefs in defense of Runyon."). 
22. See Govan, supra note 21 at  1063; Kramer, supra note 21 a t  268. 
23. See Govan, supra note 21 at  1063. ("Ultimately, the Court, backing down 
from a frontal attack on the scope of section 1981, reaffirmed its earlier decision in 
Runyon.") (footnote omitted); see also Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": 
The Case For An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 
179 n. 12 (1989) ("Perhaps an argument can be made that the decision to reaffirm 
Runyon was not really based on stare decisis, but was a response to the remark- 
able public outcry accompanying the Court's announcement that it would reconsider 
Runyon ."). 
24. Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989) superseded 
by statute, 42 U.S.C. 1981 (1994). 
25. Id. at 177. The Court ruled that the statute's prohibition was limited to 
discrimination in the hiring process. It found that "make" related to discriminatory 
offers and refusals to contract, id. at  176, and that "enforce" only related to an 
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rejected critical legislative history on the statute's origin and 
evolution which showed that it was "designed to protect the 
freedmen from the imposition of working conditions that evi- 
dence an intent on the part of the employer not to contract on 
nondiscriminatory terms."26 Retention of Runyon's prohibition 
of private discrimination was one of a few victories discrimina- 
tion victims enjoyed when the Court completely constricted the 
ambit of 5 1981 in Patterson. 
Patterson left discrimination victims with limited protec- 
tion and left the Runyon decision open to future challenge. 
While arnici input in Patterson may have shielded Runyon, that 
protection was only superficial because the Court did not rule 
that Runyon correctly interpreted 5 1981. Civil rights advocates 
had to step up their efforts politically and persuade Congress 
that the Court's decision in Patterson was wrong. After a two 
year battle, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1 9 9 1 , ~ ~  
which included a provision that essentially overruled Patterson 
and provided more security for R ~ n y o n . ~ ~  
As Patterson illustrates, amici protest requires backing 
from an array of institutional organizations, which serve as 
reflectors of public outcry. Couple this with the check of Con- 
gress as a "veto-empowered" coordinate branch, and the poten- 
tial to chart the Court's interpretive course can be realized. But 
the democratic model as an institutional restraint on the 
Court's wayward interpretive choices is unreliable because the 
Court has demonstrated a willingness to act outside of constitu- 
tional constraints. In the civil rights area, for example, the 
Court has been willing to revisit statutory provisions after 
congressional amendments in order to 'legislate" its preferenc- 
es. 29 
individual's right to equal access to the legal process, id. at  177. 
26. Id. at  206 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
27. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended in scat- 
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
28. Id. 5 101. The relevant provisions provide: "For purposes of this section, 
the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance, modifi- 
cation, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, 
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." Id. 5 lOl(b). To insulate 
Runyon, Congress also provided: "The rights protected by this section are protected 
against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color 
of State law." Id. 5 101(c). 
29. The Court's decision to return and review burden allocations in disparate 
treatment cases soon after the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed is one example. 
See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (holding that 
plaintiff's proof that an employer's defense is a lie is not sufficient to support judg- 
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B. Democratic Rigors As Check On Judicial Abuse 
The Court's willingness to offer interpretations grounded in 
popular majoritarian preferences also undermines the notion 
that the Court is most susceptible to influence when protest is 
grounded in and filters through the rigors of the democratic 
process. Recent examples include the Court's hurried lead in 
defining the parameters for civil rights3' and affirmative ac- 
t i ~ n . ~ '  Cases in these areas show that the Court sometimes 
assumes the role of political pollster and offers interpretations 
consistent with popular majoritarian sentiments prior to the 
appropriate coordinate branch acting. The Court's majoritarian 
action preempts domestic popular outcry and amici-the most 
powerful type of nonparty protest. 
National civil rights attention has moved from sympathy 
and support for minorities32 to concerns about the rights of 
"innocent white victims." In the public sphere, polls suggest a 
growing concern among caucasians regarding affirmative action 
programs.33 This unpopularity has set executive, legislative, 
and judicial forces in motion. 
At the political level, "angry-white-male[s]" have voted 
their opposition by abandoning the Democratic Party and help- 
ing Republicans gain control of C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  These individuals 
are also supporting ballot initiatives that would eliminate pref- 
erential programs instituted by state  government^.^^ Presiden- 
tial hopefuls have tapped into affirmative action's disfavor to 
ment as a matter of law). 
30. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 
2475 (1995). 
31. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
32. As late as 1991, "rainbow" support could be found for minority-protective 
schemes. Civil rights advocates were able to overcome a presidential veto and re- 
turn with bipartisan support sufficient to secure passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). 
33. Richard Lacayo, A New Push for Blind Justice, TIME, Feb. 20, 1995, at  
39; Steven V. Roberts, Affirmative Action on the Eclge, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Feb. 13, 1995, at  32. 
34. See Angie Cannon, Stand up for What Works, Clinton Urges, MIAMI HER- 
ALD, April 9, 1995, at  A13 (While Clinton was trying to placate the Democrats 
who have long been supporters of affirmative action, he also was trying to appease 
the so-called angry-white-male voters, who abandoned the Democratic Party in 
droves in November and helped catapult Republicans to power."). 
35. See id.; see also Angie Cannon & Donna St. George, Clinton Stands Firm 
on Afirmative Action, MIAMI HERALD, July 20, 1995, at  A5; Peter Schrag, Son of 
187, NEW REPUBLIC, January 30, 1995, a t  16. 
FOREIGN AMICI 
galvanize the Republican party, divide Democrats, and appeal 
to suburban white male voters.36 At the legislative level, Sen- 
ator Dole and others have threatened to introduce legislation to 
ban preferential schemes grounded in race or gender.37 At the 
executive level, President Clinton is reviewing an array of pref- 
erential programs in order to weed out the "unnecessary" ones 
and placate Democrats and white swing voters.38 
The scores of preferential schemes at  issue have their gen- 
esis in executive orders, statutes, and other regulatory 
schemes. Furthermore, the public concerns that triggered the 
creation of these programs are now giving way to public outcry 
that seeks their elimination. Rather than wait for statutory or 
regulatory repeal, the Supreme Court joined the fray and decid- 
ed Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pens:' a minority set-aside 
case. In a decision that smacks of popular white anger, the 
Court ruled that any public preferential scheme grounded in 
race must be subjected to strict scrutiny analy~is.~' This con- 
clusion effectively overruled two Supreme Court precedents 
which established a lesser level of scrutiny for federal actors." 
Adarand also sends a grim signal to supporters of employ- 
ment affirmative action schemes, soon after these supporters 
were able to salvage some preferential programs in Congress. 
After expending a great deal of political energy and bargaining 
chips on the Civil Rights Act of 1991:~ civil rights advocates 
36. See Howard Fineman, Race and Rage, NEWSWEEK, April 3, 1995, a t  23; 
Dave Lesher & Amy Wallace, Battle Looms on Move to Color-Blind Colleges, MIAMI 
HERALD, July 22, 1995, a t  A14; Carl Mollins, A White Male Backlash, MCCLEAN'S, 
March 20, 1995, a t  22. 
37. See Harvey Berkman, Guide to Afirmative Action is Sent to Agencies, 
NAT'L L.J., July 17, 1995, at A12. 
38. Fineman, supra note 36, a t  22. The President's first report released on 
July 19, 1995, concluded that federal affirmative action programs are necessary 
and fair. See Harvey Berkman, Clinton Report Makes Case for Afirmative Action, 
, 
N A T ~  L.J., July 31, 1995, at Al l .  
39. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). 
40. Id. 
41. See Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (permitting 
intermediate scrutiny of two FCC policies that gave preferences to racial minori- 
ties), overruled by, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. (1995); Fullilove 
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (holding that federal preferential programs need 
not be subjected to the most searching judicial inquiry because the federal govern- 
ment stands above racial politics). 
42. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified largely in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the political energy expended to secure 
passage, see Stephen A. Plass, Bedrock Principles, Elusive Construction, and the 
Future of Equal Employment Laws, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 313 (1992). 
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were able to protect schemes recognized as legal at  that 
time.43 In view of Adarand, it is doubtful the Court intends to 
wait on congressional initiatives designed to roll back or elimi- 
nate employment preferential schemes." In 1991, affirmative 
action opponents did not have the political muscle to legislate 
affirmative action out of Title V I I . ~ ~  Even now, they may not 
have the popular or legislative strength to statutorily ban such 
preferences. But the Court's alliance with this majoritarian 
cause will likely keep it off the sidelines. Whether or not there 
is sufficient public support or congressional will to legislate out 
employment preferences, the Court is likely to find congressio- 
nal intent barring such programs, or congressional indecision 
and deference to the Court's "e~per t i se .~ '~~ As a result, even 
domestic efforts which sometimes yield principled results re- 
main costly and susceptible to future Court activism. 
11. FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC PROTEST COMBINED 
Another approach picketers may use to influence the Court 
combines foreign and domestic protest and amicus brief sub- 
mission. This approach is sometimes pursued in treaty inter- 
pretation cases. The United States Constitution recognizes 
treaties as the law of the land. Clause 2 of Article VI provides: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
43. See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 5 116, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) ("Nothing in 
the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect court-ordered reme- 
dies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are in accordance with the 
law."). 
44. Several bills already have been sponsored by Senator Helms. See Civil 
Rights Restoration Act of 1995, S. 26, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also S. 
318, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). 
45. Republican opponents of affirmative action settled for statements in the 
record such as Senator Hatch's comment that "[the Act] expresses neither congres- 
sional approval nor disapproval of any judicial decision affecting court-ordered rem- 
edies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements."). See 137 CONG. REC. S15,320 
(daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
46. The Court took this route when it was called upon to say whether the 
1991 Civil Rights Act applied retroactively. See Landgraf v. US1 Film Prod., 114 S. 
Ct. 1483 (1994); Rivers v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1510 (1994) (holding that 
the Act does not apply retroactively and that statutory text and legislative history 
suggest that Congress failed to resolve this issue). 
FOREIGN AMICI 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not- 
~ithstanding.~~ 
The Constitution also provides an advice and consent role for 
the Senate in the treaty-making process.48 
The Constitution vests the Supreme Court with final au- 
thority to interpret treaties:' and the jurisprudential rules for 
treaty interpretation are akin to those utilized in statutory 
construction cases. In that regard, the Court has long recog- 
nized that textual mandates should take precedence; when text 
is clear it should be given its obvious meaning.50 In harmony 
with its position of textual preeminence, the Court has also 
noted that interpretations offered by the executive are not 
con~lusive,~~ yet historically the Court has gone on to adopt 
such interpretations no matter how ~ontroversial .~~ Further, 
the Court may be influenced by express senatorial declarations 
made at the time a treaty is ratified.53 In contrast, interpreta- 
tions offered by foreign treaty parties have been rejected54 or 
47. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
48. U.S. CONST. art. 11, 5 2 ("He [the President] shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds 
of the Senators present concur . . . ."). 
49. U.S. CONST. art. 111, 5 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in 
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, 
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . ."). 
50. Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1963); see also United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (text is the first source of 
guidance). 
51. However, the Court has also repeatedly concluded that such interpreta- 
tions should be given great weight. See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc., v. Avagliano, 
457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1992) ("Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to 
treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and 
enforcement is entitled to great weight."); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 
(1960) ('While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by 
the department of government particularly charged with their negotiation and en- 
forcement is given great weight." (footnote omitted)); see also Factor v. Lau- 
benheimer, 290 US. 276, 295 (1933). 
52. Recent examples include the Haitian Refugee and Alvarez-Machain cases. 
See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993); United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
53. See Bederman, supra note 1, a t  959. For a broader discussion of the 
Senate's role in treaty making and interpretation, see Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Fred- 
erick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control Over the Conclusion and Oper- 
ation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (1991). 
54. See Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 113 S. Ct. 1095 (1993). In 
Itel, an American cargo container company argued that it was exempt from state 
sales tax because, among other things, this tax conflicted with two international 
conventions to which the United States is a signatory. Id. at  1098. To support this 
argument, Itel relied heavily on an amicus brief filed by the United Kingdom 
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ignored55 although foreign governments have been encouraged 
by the United States State Department to file amicus briefs.56 
Foreign amici's failure is in some measure due to the his- 
toric rule of deference to executive interpretations?? But this 
is only part of the story. The opinions, actions, and inaction of 
foreign governments have played a role in the Court's interpre- 
tive work, but only when they confirm and buttress executive 
interpretations? The Court's selective consideration and reli- 
which demonstrated that the United Kingdom imposed no such tax on container 
leases of that kind. Id. at  1100. The Court rejected this argument and other sup- 
porting evidence by noting that: 
As further evidence in support of its position, Itel points to the state- 
ments of signatory nations objecting to Tennessee's taxation of container 
leases. With all due respect to those statements, we adhere to our inter- 
pretation. We are mindful that 11 nations (Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom), each a signatory to at  least one Container Convention 
have sent a diplomatic note to the United States Department of State 
submitting that they do not "impose sales taxes (or equivalent taxes of 
different nomenclatures) on the lease of cargo containers that are used in 
international commerce among the Contracting Parties to the Conven- 
tions." 
Id. at  1100-01 (quoting Appendix to Brief for United Kingdom and Northern Ire- 
land as Amicus Curiae at  la, Itel, 113 S. Ct. 1095). 
55. In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992), no reference to 
Mexico's amicus brief was made in the majority opinion. The persuasive interpreta- 
tion offered by Mexico as amicus had to be developed in dissent. See id. at  671 
n.1, 673-75 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
56. See Diplomatic Missions and Embassy Property: Communications to 
Courts, 1978 DIGEST § 1, at  560 (discussing the switch from diplomatic notes trans- 
mitted to the Court to amicus briefs). 
57. See generally Arthur M .  Weisburd, The Executive Branch and Internation- 
al Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205 (1988). For a discussion associating this deference 
with conservative Justices, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Is the Rehnquist Court Really 
that Conservative?: An Analysis of the 1991-92 Term, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 987 
(1993). For discussions on how this deferential posture plays itself out in immi- 
gration matters, see Johnson, supra note 4; and Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration 
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statuto- 
ry Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
58. See Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), in which the Court relied on 
the "opinions" expressed by signatories of the Warsaw Convention made at  an 
international conference on air law, in interpreting that treaty's use of the word 
"accident." The Court ruled, "'we find the opinions of our sister signatories to be 
entitled to considerable weight.'" Id. at  404 (citing Benjamins v. British European 
Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 US. 1114 (1979)); see 
also id. a t  403 ("Reference to the conduct of the parties to the Convention . . . 
helps clarify the meaning of the term."). 
The Court's willingness to rely on the conduct of foreign states when it coin- 
cides with the executive's interpretation is evidenced by several decisions. See 
Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 US. 243 (1984), which relied on 
the past practice of foreign states to interpret the air cargo liability limitation 
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ance on foreign sources highlights the potential influence these 
sources may have when presented to the Court in the form of 
amici. Yet that potential has gone unrealized for so long that it 
is evident that that form of protest suffers significant limita- 
tions. The Haitian refugee cases illustrate some of the weak- 
nesses of foreign amici, even of foreign amici who have domes- 
tic constituencies rallying by their side. 
A. Domestic Interpretation of the INA and Refugee Protocol 
The Haitian refugee crisis arose when, on May 23, 1992 
President Bush by Executive Order implemented a policy of 
interdicting refugees in international waters and returning 
them to their country of origin without screening to determine 
provision of the Warsaw Convention. Siding with the executive's interpretation that 
the Convention's liability limit remains enforceable, the Court stated: "Our task of 
construing those purposes is, however, made considerably easier by the 50 years of 
consistent international and domestic practices under the Convention." Id. a t  255. 
The Court added: 
We may not ignore the actual, reasonably harmonious practice adopted by 
the United States and other signatories in the first 40 years of the 
Convention's existence. In determining whether the Executive Branch's 
domestic implementation of the Convention is consistent with the 
Convention's terms, our task is to construe a "contract" among nations. 
The conduct of the contracting parties in implementing that contract in 
the first 50 years of its operation cannot be ignored. 
Id. at  259-60 (citations omitted); see also Sumitomo Shoji America Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1981) (the Court accepted an interpretation of the Friend- 
ship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty offered by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Af- 
fairs). In Sumitomo, the Court noted that "Moth the Ministry of Foreign AfYairs of 
Japan and the United States Department of State agree that a United States cor- 
poration, even when wholly owned by a Japanese company, is not a company of 
Japan under the Treaty and is therefore not covered by Article VIII(1). . . . 
Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Gov- 
ernment agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to 
great weight." Id. at  183-85. 
An example of foreign state inaction serving as a reliable interpretive guide can 
be found in O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986). In O'Connor the Court 
relied on the government of Panama's silence as support for the Court's conclusion 
that the Panama Canal Treaty did not exempt from United States income taxes 
certain employees of the Panama Canal Commission. The Court found that 
[ilt is undisputed that, pursuant to clear Executive Branch policy, the 
Panama Canal Commission consistently withheld United States income 
taxes from petitioners and others similarly situated and that Panama,' 
which had four of its own nationals on the Board of the Commission, did 
not object. The course of conduct of parties to an international agreement, 
like the course of conduct of parties to any contract, is evidence of its 
meaning. 
Id. at  33 (citations omitted). 
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their eligibility for asylum.59 Although the order did not men- 
59. Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. 
8 1182 (1994). The Executive Order reads: 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and 
the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 
215(a)(l) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (8 U.S.C. 
1182(f) and 1185(a)(l) . . .), and whereas: 
(1) The President has authority to suspend the entry of aliens coming 
by sea to the United States without necessary documentation, to establish 
reasonable rules and regulations regarding, and other limitations on, the 
entry or attempted entry of aliens into the United States, and to repatri- 
ate aliens interdicted beyond the territorial sea of the United States; 
(2) The international legal obligations of the United States under the 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.S. T.I.A.S. 
6577; 19 U.S.T. 6223) to apply Article 33 of the United Nations Conven- 
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees do not extend to persons located 
outside the territory of the United States; 
(3) Proclamation No. 4865 [set out [above]] suspends the entry of all 
undocumented aliens into the United States by the high seas; and 
(4) There continues to be a serious problem of persons attempting to 
come to the United States by sea without necessary documentation and 
otherwise illegally; 
I, GEORGE BUSH, President of the United States of America, hereby 
order as follows: 
SECTION 1. The Secretary of State shall undertake to enter into, on 
behalf of the United States, cooperative arrangements with appropriate 
foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal migration to the 
United States by sea. 
SEC. 2. (a) The Secretary of the Department in which the Coast 
Guard is operating, in consultation, where appropriate, with the Secretary 
of Defense, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of State, shall issue 
appropriate instructions to the Coast Guard in order to enforce the sus- 
pension of the entry of undocumented aliens by sea and the interdiction 
of any defined vessel carrying such aliens. 
(b) Those instructions shall apply to any of the following defined ves- 
sels: 
(1) Vessels of the United States, meaning any vessel documented or 
numbered pursuant to the laws of the United States, or owned in whole 
or in part by the United States, a citizen of the United States, or a cor- 
poration incorporated under the laws of the United States or any State, 
Territory, District, Commonwealth, or possession thereof, unless the vessel 
has been granted nationality by a foreign nation in accord with Article 5 
of the Convention on the High Seas of 1958 (U.S. T.I.A.S. 5200; 13 U.S.T. 
2312). 
(2) Vessels without nationality or vessels assimilated to vessels with- 
out nationality in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 6 of the Con- 
vention on the High Seas of 1958 (U.S. T.I.A.S. 5200; 13 U.S.T. 2312). 
(3) Vessels of foreign nations with whom we have arrangements au- 
thorizing the United States to stop and board such vessels. 
(c) Those instructions to the Coast Guard shall include appropriate 
directives providing for the Coast Guard: 
(1) To stop and board defined vessels, when there is reason to believe 
that such vessels are engaged in the irregular transportation of persons 
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tion Haiti, a contemporaneous press release made it clear that 
the order was directed at Haitian refugees?' This policy was 
or violations of United States law or the law of a country with which the 
United States has an arrangement authorizing such action. 
(2) To make inquiries of those on board, examine documents and take 
such actions as are necessary to carry out this order. 
(3) To return the vessel and its passengers to the country from which 
it came, or to another country, when there is reason to believe that an 
offense is being committed against the United States immigration laws, or 
appropriate laws of a foreign country with which we have an arrange- 
ment to assist; provided, however, that the Attorney General, in his unre- 
viewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a refugee will not 
be returned without his consent. 
(d) These actions, pursuant to this section, are authorized to be un- 
dertaken only beyond the territorial sea of the United States. 
SEC. 3. This order is intended only to improve the internal manage- 
ment of the Executive Branch. Neither this order nor any agency guide- 
lines, procedures, instructions, directives, rules or regulations implement- 
ing this order shall create, or shall be construed to create, any right or 
benefit, substantive or procedural (including without limitation any right 
or benefit under the Administrative Procedure Act [5 U.S.C. 551 et seq., 
701 et seq. . . .I), legally enforceable by any party against the United 
States, its agencies or instrumentalities, officers, employees, or any other 
person. Nor shall this order be construed to require any procedures to de- 
termine whether a person is a refugee. 
SEC. 4. Executive Order No. 12324 is hereby revoked and replaced by 
this order. 
SEC. 5. This order shall be effective immediately. 
60. See White House Statement on Haitian Migrants, 28 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 924 (May 24, 1992). 
President Bush has issued an Executive order which will permit the 
U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up a t  sea directly to 
Haiti. This action follows a large surge in Haitian boat people seeking to 
enter the United States and is necessary to protect the lives of the Hai- 
tians, whose boats are not equipped for the 600 mile sea journey. 
The large number of Haitian migrants has led to a dangerous and 
unmanageable situation. Both the temporary processing facility a t  the 
U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo and the Coast Guard cutters on patrol are 
filled to capacity. The President's action will also allow continued orderly 
processing of more than 12,000 Haitians presently a t  Guantanamo. 
Through broadcasts on the Voice of America and public statements in 
the Haitian media, we continue to urge Haitians not to attempt the dan- 
gerous sea journey to the United States. Last week alone, 18 Haitians 
perished when their vessel capsized off the Cuban coast. 
Under current circumstances, the safety of Haitians is best assured by 
remaining in their country. We urge any Haitians who fear persecution to 
avail themselves of our refugee processing service a t  our Embassy in 
Port-au-Prince. The Embassy has been processing refugee claims since 
February. We utilize this special procedure in only four countries in the 
world. We are prepared to increase the American Embassy staff in Haiti 
for refugee processing if necessary. 
The United States Coast Guard has picked up over 34,000 since the 
coup in Haiti last September 30. Senior U.S. officials are seeking the 
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criticized by candidate and President-elect Clinton who vowed 
to reverse it upon taking office." However, just prior to inau- 
guration, Clinton reversed his position and adopted the Bush 
policy of forced repatriation without s~ reen ing .~~  
Clinton's decision to continue the Bush policy implicated 
both domestic statutory law,63 international con~entions,6~ 
and a cooperative agreement between the United States and 
~ a i t i ?  However, political concerns appeared to be the driving 
force for the President's decision. For instance, many support- 
assistance of other countries and the United Nations to help deal with 
the plight of Haitian boat people, and we will continue our intensive 
efforts to find alternative solutions to avoid further tragedies on the high 
seas. 
The President has also directed an intensification of our ongoing hu- 
manitarian assistance efforts in Haiti. Our current programs total $47 
million and provide food for over 600,000 Haitians and health care servic- 
es which reach nearly 2 million. We hope other nations will also increase 
their humanitarian assistance as called for in the resolution on Haiti 
passed by the OAS foreign ministers on May 17. 
61. See Christopher Marquis, Clinton: Summary Repatriations to Haiti to End, 
MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 13, 1992, at  A24. 
62. Aides Say Clinton Will Extend Policy on Returning Haitians, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 14, 1993, at  Al. 
63. The Immigration and ~ a t i o n a l i t ~  Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified as amended in various sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
64. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 
28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The United States acceded to the 
convention on Jan. 31, 1967. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 
1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
65. Agreement effected by exchange of notes; signed a t  Port-au-Prince Septem- 
ber 23, 1981: This interdiction agreement dealt with the subject of illegal immi- 
gration. It provides in relevant part: 
The United States Government confirms the understandings discussed 
by representatives of our two governments for the establishment of a 
cooperative program of interdiction and selective return to Haiti of certain 
Haitian migrants and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons com- 
ing from Haiti. 
. . .  
The United States Government appreciates the assurances which it 
has received from the Government of the Republic of Haiti that Haitians 
returned to their country and who are not traffickers will not be subject 
to prosecution for illegal departure. 
It is understood that under these arrangements the United States 
Government does not intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants 
whom the United States authorities determine qualify for refugee status. 
. . . 
[This accord] shall continue in force until six months from the date 
either government gives notice to the other of its intention to terminate 
the agreement. 
19 U.S.T. 6223. 
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ers of fleeing Haitians viewed President Bush's institution of 
the repatriation policy as partly motivated by racism66 espe- 
cially since Cubans were simultaneously being warmly re- 
ceived?? Clinton certainly did not want this label, particularly 
from blacks and Haitian immigrants who are generally sup- 
porters of the Democratic party. Once in office, however, 
Clinton had to respond to a national constituency which in- 
creasingly has voiced its disfavor with the heavy immigrant in- 
Pressure also came from groups and officials opposed to 
the admission of Haitian refugees, including state and county 
officials from Florida6' whose call for an exclusionary policy 
for Haitian refugees coincided with a fairly widespread desire 
for increased immigration enforcement." In effect, the deci- 
66. See Malissia Lennox, Refugees, Racism, and Reparations: A Critique of the 
United States' Haitian Immigration Policy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 687 (1993); Cheryl 
Little, United States Haitian Policy: A History of Discrimination, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. 
HUM. RTS. 269 (1993); see also HAITI PARADIGM, supra note 1, a t  2422 ("[Tlhe 
archetypal 'good' alien favored by American immigration law is a white, European, 
healthy, heterosexual, self-sufficient refugee, arriving alone in search of political 
asylum--Mikhail Baryshnikov, for example . . . ."); Motomura, supra note 57, a t  
587-89 (discussing race discrimination against Haitians in the context of constitu- 
tional and statutory law). 
67. See Andres Viglucci & Paul Anderson, Immigration Nominee Opposes 
Special Treatment for Cubans, MIAMI HERALD, June 19, 1993, a t  A1 ("Doris 
Meissner, nominated by President Clinton on Friday to be immigration commission- 
er, has advocated repeal of the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, saying the special 
treatment it affords to Cuban refugees over Haitians and other immigrants is 'a 
national embarrassment.'"). 
68. There is some evidence that both Presidents Bush and Clinton had 
learned hard political lessons from previous immigration crises. For example, the 
Marie1 boatlifi had hurt the Carter administration and cost Clinton the governor's 
office in Arkansas. See Jonathan Atler, This Boy's Life, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, 
a t  32; Matthew Cooper, Clinton's Last Comeback, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 
20, 1992, at  32; Gary Wills, Beginning of the Road, TIME, July 20, 1992, a t  33, 59. 
For a critique of the role anti-immigrant sentiments may have played, see HAITI 
PARADIGM, supra note 1, a t  2410-11. 
69. For example, Florida Republican Senator Connie Mack, although opposed 
to the Bush policy of repatriation, was primarily concerned about any changes that 
could lead to mass entry that would negatively impact South Florida. Nancy 
Wittenberg, the state's refugee coordinator, similarly stated that she hoped Presi- 
dent Bill Clinton would prohibit mass entries because the state of Florida and 
Dade County were experiencing tough economic times and therefore were unpre- 
pared to handle large numbers of Haitian immigrants. See Paul Anderson, Clinton's 
Florida Ties Put to Test, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 8, 1992, a t  A26. 
70. Tolerance for new immigrants has faded over the years, resulting in in- 
creasing cries for more stringent immigration laws. See Kevin R. Johnson, Judicial 
Acquiescence to the Executive Branch's Pursuit of Foreign Policy and Domestic 
Agendas in Immigration Matters: The Case of the Haitian Asylum Seekers, 7 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (1993). 
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sion on Haitian refugees got caught up in election politics and 
community agitation stemming from a slow economy, high 
unemployment, and limited governmental resources at all lev- 
e1s.71 
But fleeing Haitians had broad-based support for their 
case. Besides wide-ranging popular support,72 able legal mus- 
cle joined the fray,?3 along with civil and human rights organi- 
z a t i o n ~ ~ ~  and members of C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  President Clinton's in- 
terpretation of American immigration laws and the interdiction 
agreement between the United States and Haiti was therefore 
made in the context of possible popular constituency fallout and 
congressional involvement in revising the Immigration and 
Nationality Act. 
National political concerns, real or speculative, seem to 
have dominated executive thinking about Haitian asylum seek- 
ers. Though it seems clear that the original repatriation order 
did not stem from a genuine interpretation of refugee laws, the 
71. See Johnson, supra note 70, a t  16-18. 
72. See Holly Idelson, Black Leaders Criticize Continuation of Policy, 51 
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 520 (1993) (black leaders oppose the Clinton repatriation 
policy which denies Haitians opportunity to state their claims.); Christopher J. 
Farley, Reading, Writing, 'Rithmetic, Rage, TIME, April 19, 1993, at  15 (students 
rally in support of Haitian refugees); William Gibson, President George Bush's Poli- 
cy on Haitians is Indefensible, Cruel Racism, CRISIS, June-July 1992, a t  6 (dancer 
and choreographer Katherine Dunham goes on hunger strike and calls Bush's Hai- 
tian policy undemocratic); Sally Guard, For the Record, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Sep. 
21, 1992, at  66 (Arthur Ashe and others protesting treatment of Haitians arrested 
in front of White House); Notes of Protest, NATION, March 29, 1993, a t  401 (Yale 
students hold protest, teach-in, rally and hunger strike in support of Haitian refu- 
gees). 
73. See HAITI PARADIGM, supra note 1, at  2395 n.21. The Haitian Refugee 
Center in Miami also filed suits continuing their advocacy on behalf of fleeing Hai- 
tians. See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 789 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Fla.) 
(suing and obtaining preliminary injunction against interdiction policy), injunction 
dissolved, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1122 (1992); see 
also Victoria Clawson et al., Essay, Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look a t  
Haitian Centers Council, 103 YALE L.J. 2337 (1994). 
74. See, e.g., Bernard Diederich, Send 'Em Back!, TIME, June 8, 1992, at  43 
(noting the participation of the U.S. Catholic Conference's Office of Migration and 
Refugee Services); Bill Frelick, Haitians a t  Sea: Asylum Denied, REPORTS ON THE 
AMERICAS, July 1992, at 34 (noting the involvement of human rights activists and 
movements); Lydio F. Tomasi, End the Haitian Refugee Crisis, MIGRATION WORLD 
MAG., May-June 1992, at  52 (condemning the repatriation policy as shameful and 
noting the political efforts of the Center for Migration Studies in support of Hai- 
tian refugees). 
75. See Pamela Fessler, Members Decry Haiti Policy, Vow to Seek Changes, 
CONG. Q. WEY. REP. 1547 (1992) (many legislators view President Bush's Haitian 
refugee policy as an election year political ploy and will introduce legislation to 
overturn it). 
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Clinton Administration defended its continuation of the Bush 
policy and argued before the Supreme Court in Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council, Inc. that neither United States immigration 
laws nor the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees apply e~traterritorially.~~ Section 243(h)(l), the con- 
tested provision of the Immigration Act, provides in relevant 
part: 
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien . . . 
to a country if the Attorney General determines that such 
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on 
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a partic- 
ular social group, or political opinion." 
Article 33 of the Protocol provides in relevant part: "No Con- 
tracting State shall expel or return ("refoulern) a refugee in any 
manner whatsoever to  the frontiers of territories where his life 
or freedom would be threatened. . . .n78 The United States 
ratified the Protocol in 1967.~' 
Prior to the litigation in Sale, the United States had taken 
the position that the Protocol's provision on return (refouler) 
applied to the high seas?' Despite this acknowledgment and 
strong textual support for this interpretation, the government 
argued the opposite throughout the litigation. The government 
also knew that political persecution was common in Haiti with 
its long history of coups and political bloodshed, the most re- 
cent associated with the ouster of the first democratically elect- 
ed President, Jean Bertrand Ari~tide.~' The government ar- 
gued that, read as a whole, the INA does not apply to actions 
taken by the President or Coast Guard outside the United 
States.82 Further, the government asserted that the statute's 
negotiations history supported this interpretati~n?~ The gov- 
76. 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993). 
77. 8 U.S.C. 8 1253(h)(1) (1988). 
78. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 
1951, art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. 
79. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
80. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2568 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Andrew I. 
Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting Persecutors: The Seizure and Return of Haitian 
Refugees in Violation of the U.N. Refugees Convention and Protocol, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 67, 72-73 (1993). 
81. See Johnson, supra note 70, at 11-14. 
82. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2558. 
83. Id. at 2558-59. 
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ernment made the same argument for Article 33 of the Proto- 
col, contending that its text and negotiations history do not 
support extraterritorial appl i~a t ion .~~ 
It is very difficult, however, to impose this interpretation 
on the INA and Protocol which seemingly contain plain lan- 
guage. The INA provides that the Attorney General shall not 
deport or return any alien.85 This prohibition is explicit. More- 
over, this language amends the previous textual formulation: 
"The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deporta- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~  When the current text of the INA is juxtaposed 
against its predecessor, there is an evident design to limit the 
Attorney General's powers of repatriation. Congress went fur- 
ther when it amended the INA in 1980. Besides the limitation 
on the Attorney General, Congress added the word "return" 
after "deport," thereby broadening the literal and legal ambit of 
the ~ ta tu te .~ '  In addition, Congress removed the limitation 
"within the United States" that appeared in the old INA in 
order to eliminate any territorial constraints on the statute's 
appl i~at ion.~~ Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the stat- 
ute does not apply extraterritorially." 
Because Congress limited the power of the Attorney Gener- 
al in the areas of deportations and returns, the Court relied on 
elusive distinctions among powers of the President, the Attor- 
ney General, and the Coast Guard in reaching its conclusion. 
Using the presumption that acts of Congress ordinarily do not 
apply outside United States territory, the Court interpreted 
section 243(h)(1) as regulating only the Attorney General in 
carrying out her normal responsibilitie~.~~ The Court further 
reasoned that the INA provided a grant of presidential powers 
that superseded the limitations imposed on the Attorney Gen- 
eral.gl Therefore, the Court found that even if Congress had 
restricted the Attorney General from acting extraterritorially to 
return asylum seekers, the same restriction did not apply to 
the President or the Coast Guard.92 This analytical ploy 
84. See id. 
85. 8 U.S.C. $ 1253(h)(l). 
86. Pub. L. No. 82-414, $ 243(h), 66 Stat. 163 (1952). 
87. See Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2574 (Blackrnun, J., dissenting). 
88. See id. at 2574-75. 
89. Id. at 2560-63. 
90. Id. at 2559-60. 
91. Id. 
92. See id. at 2559. 
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prompted Justice Blackmun to comment: "The majority sug- 
gests indirectly that the law which the Coast Guard enforces 
when it carries out the order to return a vessel reasonably 
believed to be violating the immigration laws is somehow not a 
law that the Attorney General is charged with administering. 
That suggestion is In fact, the much contested his- 
tory of 243(h) and its ultimate amendment in 1980 demon- 
strate an intent to ensure its conformity with Article 33 of the 
~ r o t o c o l . ~ ~  
The Court also agreed with the government's argument 
that Article 33 of the Protocol does not apply extraterritorially. 
Faced with clear language that contravened its interpretation, 
the Court resorted to ''legal meaning" analysis to construe the 
word "return" rather than accept its ordinary or literal mean- 
ing. The Court condemned dictionary definitions of return and 
refouler although dictionaries have become a standard tool in 
the Court's interpretive Instead, the Court relied on 
its fabricated interpretive device (legal meaning) which, when 
applied to the word "return," produced a meaning narrower 
than its ordinary, literal, or customary meaning.96 The Court 
decided that the legal meaning of "return" refers to the exclu- 
sion of aliens and that: 
The drafters of the Convention and the parties to the Proto- 
col-like the drafters of section 243(h)-may not have con- 
templated that any nation would gather fleeing refhgees and 
return them to the one country they had desperately sought 
to escape; such actions may even violate the spirit of Article 
33; but a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated extraterri- 
torial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than 
its general humanitarian intent." 
93. Id. a t  2573 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
94. See Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law in Do- 
mestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367, 386-88 (1985). 
95. See David 0. Stewart, By the Book, A.B.A. J., July 1993, a t  46 ("An in- 
formal survey reveals that in decisions announced between Jan. 1, 1992 and May 
17, 1993, the justices [sic] recited dictionary definitions of key phrases 54 times in 
38 cases, drawing on 23 different dictionaries. About half of the definitions came 
from legal dictionaries, with the rest pulled from a variety of general compendia. 
By contrast, in 1951-52 the Court recited dictionary definitions in opinions in only 
four cases."). 
96. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2563-64. 
97. Id. a t  2565. 
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Like the treatment of customary international law in the 
Machain case, international obligations were given only lip 
service. 
The Court found further support for its interpretation of 
the Protocol in the Protocol's negotiations history. Heavy reli- 
ance was placed on an interpretation "placed on record" by the 
Netherlands delegate that Article 33 does not cover mass mi- 
grations or attempted mass migrations across frontiers.98 This 
statement, read during the draft stages of the Convention, was 
substituted for plain text as the Court's controlling guide. The 
Court was not persuaded that the statement of the Nether- 
lands representative was unreliable because it was not adopted 
or agreed to by Convention par t i~ ipants .~~ Nor did the Court 
consider the abundant evidence that the mass migration con- 
cerns of the Netherlands were never intended to limit the oper- 
ation of the nonrefoulement pro~ision. '~~ The negotiations 
history makes clear that the concern about mass migration did 
not translate into an agreement that Article 33 would operate 
in a limited territorial way.lO' Convention participants agreed 
that it would be the antithesis of Article 33, and inhumane, to 
return a legitimate refugee to his country of persecution.lo2 
Thus, the Netherlands' concern related only to illegal mass 
migrations and therefore does not support an insertion of terri- 
torial boundaries into Article 33. 
In a compelling dissent, Justice Blackmun explained that 
the Court botched its interpretation of the INA and the Proto- 
col. He observed that the Court stacked the deck against Hai- 
tians by establishing a presumption against extraterritoriali- 
ty.'03 Hence, although no territorial limitation appears in the 
text of the INA or the Protocol, the Court was able to find such 
a restriction. To accomplish its desired construction the Court 
had to abandon all recognized rules of interpretation. Specifi- 
cally, the Court refused to accept the ordinary meaning of plain 
words when there was no compelling reason to do so.'" Jus- 
tice Blackmun concluded that the INKS legislative history did 
not support the Court's interpretation because in 1980 "Con- 
98. Id. at 2565-67. 
99. See id. at 2571-73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
100. See Schoenholtz, supra note 80, at 79-84. 
101. Id. at 82. 
102. See id. at 82 11.49. 
103. Sale, 113 S. Ct. at 2576 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
104. See id. at 2568-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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gress (1) deleted the words 'within the United States'; (2) 
barred the Government from 'return[ing],' as well as 'de- 
port[ing],' alien refugees; and (3) made the prohibition against 
return mandatory, thereby eliminating the discretion of the 
Attorney General over such decisions."'" 
Justice Blackmun regarded the Court's reading of a territo- 
rial limitation into the INA as restoring the specific language 
Congress excised in 1980 when it removed the phrase "within 
the United States."lo6 Justice Blackmun stated that '"[flew 
principles of statutory construction are more compelling than 
the proposition that Congress does not intend sub silentio to 
enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor 
of other lang~age.""~~ With respect to the Protocol, Justice 
Blackmun emphasized the absence of any territorial restriction 
in the treaty language and highlighted the Court's failure to 
give it its ordinary meaning.'08 He added that the statement 
of one country's delegate cannot override the treaty provisions, 
particularly when that statement was not adopted or agreed to 
and when the United States had previously taken the opposite 
view.'Og Justice Blackmun noted that if there is doubt, the 
Court, in a case such as this, should construe congressional 
action in a way that would not do violence to international 
law.''0 
B. The Interpretation Of International Amici 
Fleeing Haitians had further support from international 
amici. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees ("UNHCR") submitted an amicus brief in Sale oppos- 
ing the United States policy of repatriation and explaining the 
relevant international law.'" 
The views of UNHCR are informed by over 40 years of experi- 
ence supervising the treaty-based system of refugee protection 
established by the international community. UNHCR provides 
international protection and direct assistance to refugees 
105. Id. at 2574. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. (quoting INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 442-43 (1987)). 
108. Id. at 2568-70. 
109. Id. at 2570-72. 
110. Id. at 2577. 
111. Brief of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 113 
Ct. 2549 (1993) (NO. 92-344). 
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throughout the world and has representatives in over 80 
countries. It has twice received the Nobel Peace Prize, in 1954 
and 1981, for its work on behalf of refbgees.l12 
Through its extensive expertise and experience, UNHCR made 
available to the Court historical, evolutionary, contextual, and 
textual information to illuminate the meaning of Article 33. 
Specifically, UNHCR pointed out that the 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees was remedial and humani- 
tarian in character as evidenced by its preamble which declares 
an intent "to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of 
these fundamental rights and  freedom^.""^ One of the funda- 
mental freedoms which Article 33 guarantees is the right of 
nonreturn the minute an individual satisfies the definition of 
refugee, irrespective of whether asylum is ultimately grant- 
ed.'l4 This right of nonreturn was endorsed and advocated by 
the United States as demonstrated by statements of the United 
States delegate to the Convention. The United States delegate, 
Mr. Henkin stated, 
Whether it was a question of closing the frontier to a refbgee 
who asked admittance, or of turning him back after he had 
crossed the frontier, or even of expelling him after he had 
been admitted to residence in the territory, the problem was 
more or less the same. 
Whatever the case might be . . . he must not be turned back to 
a country where his life or freedom could be threatened. No 
consideration of public order should be allowed to overrule 
that guarantee, for if the state concerned wished to get rid of 
the refirgee at all costs, it could send him to another country 
or place him in an internment camp.ll5 
The principle of nonreturn was also endorsed by the United 
States as a member of the Organization of American States 
112. Id. at 2. 
113. Id. at 12 (quoting the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.). 
114. See id. at  8 ("Recognition of his refugee status does not therefore make 
him a refugee but declares him to be one. He does not become a refugee because 
of recognition, but is recognized because he is a refugee.") (citing UNHCR Hand- 
book on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refuge Status ¶ 28 (1992)). 
115. See id. at  25 (quoting Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related 
Problems, Summary Record of the Twentieth Meeting, 11-12, 1 54-55, U.N. Dec. 
E/AC.32/SR.20 (1950) (emphasis added)). 
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(OAS) General A~sernbl~' '~ and by the United States delegate 
to UNHCR's Executive Committee.'17 
Because of the universal acceptance of the principle of non- 
refoulement, UNHCR noted in its brief that the principle was 
regarded as a "peremptory norm of international law"'" that 
had neither geographical nor territorial limitations. 'Ig The 
UNHCR Executive Committee, of which the United States is a 
member, established many guidelines that recognized Article 
33's protection on the high seas.l2' Further, the "basic princi- 
ple of non-refoulement has been reaffirmed every year by the 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Pr~gramme."'~~ 
In addition to the powerful historical data, UNHCR pre- 
sented convincing text-based evidence to support its interpreta- 
tion of the Convention. It noted that the text of Article 33 is 
plain, unequivocal, and broad.'22 
It  prohibits both the expulsion of a refugee from a contracting 
State and, of critical importance here, the return of a rehgee 
to a territory where his or her life or freedom would be en- 
dangered. . . . [Tlhe term "return" necessarily looks to the 
place 'to' which a refugee is returned. The word "expel," by 
contrast, refers to the treatment of refugees present in a 
State's territory, since, by definition, refugees cannot be ex- 
pelled fkom a country in which they are not present. . . . [B]y 
its plain terms Article 33 announces two broad proscriptions. 
The second, known as non-refoulement or non-return, bars "in 
any manner whatsoever" the involuntary repatriation of refu- 
gees to a place where their lives or freedom would be threat- 
ened. 123 
116.. Id. a t  17. The OAS General Assembly endorsed the Cartagena Declaration 
which regarded "the principle of non-refoulement [as] 'imperative in regard to refu- 
gees and in the present state of international law should be acknowledged and 
observed as rule of jus cogens.'" Id. (quoting Colloquium on the International 
Protection of Refugees in Central America, Panama and Mexico (Cartagena de 
Indias, Nov. 22, 1984)). 
117. Id. a t  18. 
118. Id. (citing 1985 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu- 
gees, U.N. Doc. El1985162 (1985), a t  919122-23.). 
119. Id. 
120. Id. a t  20 ("These guidelines recognize that 
Article 33 extend to international waters, and thus 
particular State."). 
121. Id. n.39. 
122. See id. at 5. 
123. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
the bedrock protections of 
beyond the borders of any 
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With a dictionary and many Court precedents as support, 
UNHCR called for application of the ordinary meaning of the 
words of Article 33 while noting that the government's defini- 
tion of the word refouler would lead to redundancy and absur- 
dity. lZ4 
UNHCR offered additional support for the extraterritorial 
application of the nonreturn principle by noting that other 
articles in the treaty had territorial limitations while Article 33 
did not.lZ5 This contrast demonstrates that the drafters were 
aware of territorial considerations, and intentionally decided 
not to place geographic limitations in Article 33. Further, 
UNHCR noted that the Immigration and Nationality Act was 
amended to conform to Article 33;lZ6 that customary interna- 
tional law supported the principle of nonreturn;lZ7 and that 
the negotiations statements cited by the government were not 
accepted by the Convention delegates nor relied on by the gov- 
ernment at the time of ratifi~ati0n.l~~ 
Despite this compelling, readily available guidance, the 
Court sided with the government. The Court's action belies the 
Court's claim that longstanding domestic and international 
practices will not be ignored.lZ9 By effectively avoiding the 
data provided and contentions made by UNHCR, the Court 
continued to signal that such data is only usehl if it coincides 
with the executive branch's interpretation. 
The Court's interpretive work in Sale highlights the 
Court's aloofness toward joint protests by foreign and domestic 
124. See id. at  8, 10-11, 16-21. In recent years the Court has increasingly 
turned to dictionaries and less to legislative history in fulfilling its interpretive 
task. See Stewart, supra note 95. The Court has also been more text-focused in 
recent years and less willing to consult extratextual sources, particularly when 
language is plain. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. 
REV. 621 (1990). 
125. See Brief of The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, at  11, Sale v. Haitian Cen- 
ters Council, 113 S. Ct. 2549 (1993) (No. 92-344). 
126. Id. at 15. 
127. Id. at 16. 
128. Id. at 23-28. Besides noting that the statement by the Netherlands dele- 
gate was not "agreed to" or "adopted," id. a t  26 11.47, but rather simply placed on 
the record, UNHCR noted that formal changes to Article 33 were followed by the 
comments "adopted unanimously" and "[ilt was so agreed." Id. (citing Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Summary Record 
of the Thirty-Fiffh Meeting, 22,U.N.Doc AKonf.2lSr.35 (1951)). 
129. See Trans World Airlines Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 255, 
259-60 (1983). 
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forces. Obviously unafraid of challenges to its institutional 
integrity, the Court easily rejected sound principles of construc- 
tion and plain text in favor of weaker guides in order to adopt 
the interpretations offered by the United States government. 
Although fleeing Haitians garnered support from some domes- 
tic groups, they also faced growing domestic opposition. This 
kept the strength of their protest at the "margin" in terms of 
its potential to influence the Court. 
When foreign protest rises alone to challenge executive 
decisions which come before the Court, amici influence is virtu- 
ally non-existent. The recent government supported kidnapping 
of a Mexican doctor in Mexico serves as a good case study. On 
April 2, 1990, Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain was kidnapped 
in Mexico and brought to the United States to stand trial be- 
fore an American court for his suspected involvement in the 
brutal murder of a federal Drug Enforcement Administration 
(DEA) agent. Dr. Machain is a citizen of Mexico and the federal 
agent was killed in Mexico.130 It was later determined that 
the American government sponsored the abduction.l3' 
The United States is a party to an extradition treaty with 
Mexico which sets out a procedure for the United States to 
request the delivery of a Mexican national suspected of murder- 
ing an American nati0na1.l~~ The American government had 
reason to believe, however, that a formal treaty request for 
Machain would not be honored,133 and Mexico was not legally 
obliged to deliver him under the treaty.134 Article 9, section 1 
130. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Comment, Kidnapping by Government Order: A 
Follow-up, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 712 (1990). 
131. See United States v. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602-04, 609, 612 
(C.D. Cal. 1990) affd 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). 
Prior to the court's determination, a variety of stories surfaced about the role of 
the DEA and Mexican officials in capturing Machain and transferring him to the 
United States. The various stories posited official cooperation, a bounty offer by the 
DEA, cash payments and protection for Machain captors by the DEA, a swap of 
fugitives (Machain for a Mexican fugitive residing in the United States), and mis- 
conduct by the Mexican Federal Judicial Police. See Lowenfeld, supra note 130, a t  
713-16. 
132. See generally Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mexico, 31 U.S.T. 
5059 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. Of course the procedure would apply equally 
if Mexico were the requesting state. 
133. Informal attempts by the Drug Enforcement Administration to gain custo- 
dy of Machain through Mexican officials had apparently failed. See Caro-Quintero, 
745 F. Supp. a t  602-04. 
134. Article 9 of the treaty gives the requested State the option of turning 
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of the treaty provides: "Neither Contracting Party shall be 
bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive author- 
ity of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of 
that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discre- 
tion, it be deemed proper to do so."135 
Had Mexico decided not to extradite Machain, the treaty 
would have required Mexico to "submit the case to its compe- 
tent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that 
[Mexico had] jurisdiction over the offense."136 Consequently, 
Machain could have been brought to justice either in the Unit- 
ed States or Mexico under the treaty, making abduction unnec- 
essary. 13' 
Mexico had already demonstrated its commitment to bring- 
ing the DEA agent's murderers to justice by trying, convicting, 
and sentencing several other individuals involved in the mur- 
der.138 However, the United States executive branch had an 
extraordinary interest in ensuring that the American criminal 
justice system handle this case.13' Seizing Machain, therefore, 
would avoid a refusal by Mexico to extradite and would create 
an opportunity to test the legality of government sponsored 
kidnapping of foreign national suspects wherever they may be 
found in the world. 140 
In retrospect, the United States' decision was pragmatic 
since it yielded the results sought by the American govern- 
ment. Custody of Machain was gained to facilitate his prosecu- 
tion in the United States, and the Supreme Court ruled that 
over the suspect or trying him locally. Extradition Treaty, supra note 132, at  5065. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. However, as the judge found in Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. a t  612, nego- 
tiations between American and Mexican oflicials broke down and Mexico's attempts 
to revive those negotiations were rebuffed. Id. The United States a t  this point 
apparently believed that Mexico did not have the requisite commitment to ensure 
that Machain was brought to justice. 
138. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 671 n.2 (1992) 
(Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting) ("Mexico has already tried a num- 
ber of members involved in the conspiracy that resulted in the murder of the DEA 
agent. For example, Rafael Caro-Quintero, a co-conspirator of Alvarez-Machain in 
this case, has already been imprisoned in Mexico on a 40-year sentence."). 
139. Id. at 686. The American government probably wanted to demonstrate to 
the American public and to law enforcement officers its fierce commitment to the 
war on drugs. 
140. The DEA may not have been motivated by a desire to test Supreme 
Court doctrine on this issue, but the DEA must have analyzed the abduction's 
legal implications. 
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the kidnapping did not violate the extradition treaty.l4' 
Mexico's immediate protest of the abduction and request for 
Machain's return confirmed that Mexico may not have deliv- 
ered him to American authorities under the treaty. The Su- 
preme Court's holding that the abduction did not violate the 
extradition treaty ensured Machain's retention in the United 
States and appearance before an American court. However, 
justice for Machain was not what his accusers envisioned, be- 
cause the charges against him were ultimately di~missed. '~~ 
From the outset, Machain's abduction had the makings of a 
significant foreign policy blunder. News of the abduction trig- 
gered instant and widespread international outcry.'" So, al- 
though the United States may have fulfilled national interests, 
some damage to its foreign policy and treaty interpretation 
image was inevitable. Once the Court accepted the interpreta- 
tion proffered by the United States government, foreign indig- 
nation only increased. Understandably, therefore, concerns still 
linger about the decision to abduct and the integrity of the 
Supreme Court for upholding the abduction. 
A. Interpreting The Text and Intent of the Treaty 
The abduction of Machain presented a case of first impres- 
sion for the Supreme Court. Although the Court had a line of 
precedents on the issue of seizures covered by extradition trea- 
ties, the specific issue of government sponsored abduction of a 
141. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at  670. 
142. "U.S. District Judge Edward Rafeedie dismissed all charges Dec. 14, after 
the evidence had been presented in Alvarez-Machain's trial." Debra C. Moss, Scant 
Evidence Frees Abducted Doctor, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at  22. 
143. See David 0. Stewart, The Price of Vengeance, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, a t  50 
("Although Supreme Court rulings rarely attract international attention, the Court's 
decision last June . . . triggered a firestorm of diplomatic criticism."); see also Can- 
ada Blasts U.S. Court Ruling on Abducting Suspects, on REUTERS (radio broadcast 
from Ottowa, Can., June 15, 1992) (The External Affairs Ministry spokesman stat- 
ed: "Any attempt by foreign officials to abduct someone from Canadian territory is 
a criminal act. . . . We will continue to insist that the extradition treaty between 
Canada and the United States is the only method of obtaining custody of fugitives 
between our two countries."); Latin American Nations Fight U S .  Supreme Court 
Decision NOTIMEX MEXICAN NEWS SERVICE, June 18, 1992 (Argentine Foreign Min- 
ister denounced the decision as "deplorable" and vowed to formally protest despite 
his nation's "good relationship with the United States."); Caribbean: Region Angry 
at U S .  Supreme Court Ruling, INTER PRESS SERVICE, June 18, 1992 (Foreign Min- 
ister of Barbados "called on regional governments to speak as one in objecting to 
the Supreme Court ruling."). 
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foreign national in his homeland for a crime committed there 
had not been previously addressed. 
In addressing its primary task of treaty construction, the 
Court articulated the well-recognized rule that one must first 
look to the words of the convention to ascertain its mean- 
ing.'# This text-focused approach is an old rule that has re- 
cently increased in significance with many Justices on the 
C 0 ~ r t . l ~ ~  However, the Court swiftly moved away from the 
treaty's text since it quickly determined that the treaty was 
silent on the issue of abductions of the type at  bar.'46 Under 
the Court's analytical scheme, the treaty's silence was evidence 
that the treaty did not limit the jurisdiction of American courts. 
Only express and specific treaty language could limit the 
Court's jurisdiction. 
The Court's focus on the text thus only lasted long enough 
to discern what the treaty parties failed to include. Convenient- 
ly passed up were the terms which the United States and Mex- 
ico intentionally agreed on as governing their conduct in extra- 
dition matters. For example, the treaty sets out a comprehen- 
sive scheme on how, against whom, and for what offenses and 
circumstances extradition is available to the treaty parties.'" 
This bilateral agreement also gives each party the discretion to 
deliver or refuse delivery of a requested p e r ~ 0 n . l ~ ~  Read as a 
whole, the provisions of the treaty offer a ready answer to the 
question of whether abductions are permissible. The Court's 
abandonment of text in favor of speculative inquiries as to why 
the parties did not insert a specific provision on the abduction 
144. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. a t  663 ("In construing a treaty, as in con- 
struing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning."). 
145. The Court's use and reliance on extratextual materials has declined over 
the years. See Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative Histo- 
ry in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 
39 AM. U. L. REV. 277 (1990). Justice Scalia, who advocates what is tantamount to 
a text-exclusive approach for statutes and treaties has been increasingly influencing 
other members of the Court. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 373 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("'[Tlreaties are the subject of careful consideration before 
they are entered into, and are drawn by persons competent to express their mean- 
ing and to choose apt words in which to embody the purposes of the high contract- 
ing parties.'" (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912))). 
146. In fact, the Court's conclusion that the treaty did not resolve the abduc- 
tion issue can be found in the sentence immediately following the Court's state- 
ment that the Court should look first to the treaty's text to determine the treaty's 
meaning. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. a t  663. 
147. See generally Extradition Treaty, supra note 132, a t  5061. 
148. See id. art. 9, a t  5065. 
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issue suggests that the Court was not searching for the intent 
of the contracting parties. 
A literal and contextual reading of the treaty indicates that 
the treaty provides the exclusive mechanism for obtaining for- 
eign nationals. Such a reading would carry out the intent of the 
parties and preserve the structural integrity of the treaty. In- 
stead of deferring to the means chosen by the parties to estab- 
lish their obligations, however, the Court concluded that the 
treaty procedure was not the only way one country may gain 
custody of another's citizens.'" As support for its extratreaty 
options, the Court did not cite treaty language but instead 
relied on negotiations history and past practice. The Court 
concluded that although the treaty did not authorize the abduc- 
tion, it did not prohibit it either.'" Unfortunately, citations 
and language from the negotiations history were not provid- 
ed''' and the referenced practice seems to be a single incident 
which occurred in 1905 and which, incidentally, did not involve 
government-sponsored conduct. ls2 
As further support for its interpretation of the extradition 
treaty, the Court cited Ker v. I l l i n ~ i s , ' ~ ~  an 1886 case which 
the Court believed notified Mexico as early as 1906 '~~  that 
abductions would not defeat the jurisdiction of American courts 
notwithstanding the existence of an extradition treaty.'55 In 
addition, the Court determined that, had Mexico disagreed 
with Ker, it should have known about and secured the inclu- 
sion, in the extradition treaty, of a 1935 proposal by American 
legal scholars which had specific language prohibiting abduc- 
tions of the type involved in Ker.'56 Using a "timing" analysis, 
149. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. at  664. 
150. Id. at  665 n.11. 
151. Id. at  675 n.15 (Stevens, Blackmun, O'Connor, J.J., dissenting) ("The 
United States has offered no evidence &om the negotiating record, ratification pro- 
cess, or later communications with Mexico to support the suggestion that a differ- 
ent understanding with Mexico was reached."). 
152. Id. at  665 n.11. 
153. Id. at  660-66; Ker v. Illinois, 119 US. 436 (1886). 
154. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. a t  665 all. Ker had apparently been brought 
to the attention of the Mexican government in 1906 through correspondence from 
the Secretary of State to Mexican officials informing them that American courts 
had jurisdiction to try a Mexican national abducted in Mexico and brought to the 
United States. The correspondence also informed the Mexican government that 
their relief option was to request the extradition of the abductor, which was done 
and extradition granted. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. a t  666 & n.13. The referenced proposal states: 
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the Court concluded that the current version of the extradition 
treaty157 was informed by these prior events and, in particu- 
lar, that Mexico's failure to prohibit Ker-type abductions evi- 
denced acquiescence in their legality. 
Notice, is of course, not a substitute for text. Even more, 
the type of notice informing future conduct should be reason- 
ably specific to and predictive of the harm it seeks to guard 
against. Ker warns treaty parties about the potential jurisdic- 
tion of American courts over persons privately kidnapped.158 
The scholarly proposal referenced by the Court makes an ab- 
duction in violation of international law an invalid basis for 
gaining jurisdiction over a suspect.159 Neither Ker nor the 
proposal address state-sponsored abductions under a treaty. 
Thus, even if Ker and the cited scholarly work should be given 
some weight, neither can be held to have notified the Mexican 
government of the Court's state-sponsored abduction rule. 
Nor should the mere existence of Ker and the scholarly 
proposal override, without more, a document that expressly 
defines the obligations of Mexico and the United States. The 
representatives of these nations who negotiated the latest ver- 
sion of the treaty may well have regarded predecessor events 
as superseded by the treaty. 
Had the Court cited negotiations history showing that the 
United States rejected a proposal by Mexico to prohibit 
Machain-type abductions, its interpretation would be more 
responsive to the deal the parties struck. However, the Court's 
citations to distinguishable events as guides to ascertaining the 
intent of the parties suggest an outcome-oriented analysis rath- 
er than pursuit of principled construction. 
A more plausible construction of the treaty was offered by 
the dissenting Justices who stuck to the text of the extradition 
treaty and to related treaty provisions. The dissenters argued 
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute 
or punish any person who has been brought within its territory or a 
place subject to its authority by recourse to measures in violation of in- 
ternational law or international convention without first obtaining the 
consent of the State or States whose rights have been violated by such 
measures. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
157. The latest version of the treaty was agreed to in 1978 and remains in 
effect, thereby governing this case. Id. at 665-66. 
158. See Ker, 119 U.S. at 443-44. 
159. See supra note 156. 
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that treaty mandates cannot be trumped by nonlanguage. In 
addition, they found the treaty to be consensual, comprehen- 
sive, and exclusive on the question of e~t radi t ion . '~~ Further, 
they maintained that the parties must comply with treaty 
terms, for if either party were free to use extratreaty proce- 
dures or methods, the treaty would become a nullity?' The 
dissenters buttressed their interpretation with purposes and 
goals analysis.'62 They noted that "cooperation" was the 
touchstone of the treaty as evidenced by its preamble and that 
unilateral action threatened that goal.'63 Further, they ar- 
gued that the "scope and objectB of the treaty ought to take 
precedence over its silence on a particular issue.'" By focus- 
ing their analysis on the expectations of the parties as stated in 
the treaty's text, the dissenters established a better vehicle for 
ascertaining the parties intent. 
The dissenters also noted that the effect of the majority's 
construction was at  odds with the language of the treaty. By 
saying that the treaty was not the only way American courts 
could obtain jurisdiction over Machain, the Court in effect 
found that, at  its discretion, either party without the other's 
consent may abduct the other's nati0na1.l~~ Not only would 
such an interpretation render an absurd result under a finely 
crafted agreement, it would also evidence a shocking, secret 
reservation of right to seize by one party.'66 
160. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at  675. 
161. Id. at  673-74. 
162. Confirming a treaty or statute's text with general textual and related 
legislative materials is a sound construction approach commonly used by the Court, 
see United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989) (confirming interpretation of trea- 
ty with preratification materials); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonzeca, 480 U.S. 421 
(1987); California Fed. S&L Ass'n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). 
163. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at  672 n.4. 
164. See id. a t  675. 
165. Id. 
To make the point more starkly, the Court has, in effect written into 
Article 9 a new provision, which says: "Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 
2 of this Article, either Contracting Party can, without the consent of the 
other, abduct nationals from the territory of one Party to be tried in the 
territory of the other." 
Id. at  674 n.11. 
166. Id. at  678-79. 
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B. The Role of Precedent in Construing the Treaty 
In support of its interpretation the Court cited several of 
its precedents. While precedents have their place in treaty 
construction, they do not rise to the level of text and should be 
weighted accordingly. Further, precedents that are distinguish- 
able on factual or legal grounds are less persuasive than those 
on point in either regard. Ker u. Illinois figured prominently in 
the Court's analysis. However, Ker is distinguishable from 
Machain on numerous grounds. Ker's abduction was not gov- 
ernment ~ponsored.'~~ Ker was tried and convicted in an Illi- 
nois court prior to fleeing to Peru, the country from which he 
was abducted and with which the United States had an extra- 
dition treaty.168 Further, Ker was not a citizen of Peru and 
the Peruvian government did not object to his seizure.16' On 
these facts the Court held that Ker had no rights under the 
extradition treaty since the treaty was not triggered by his 
private kidnapping.l7' As a result, Ker could not defeat the 
Court's jurisdiction by relying on the treaty. 
To confirm the vitality of Ker the Court cited its 1952 deci- 
sion in Frisbie v. Collins.171 Frisbie involved an interstate 
kidnapping of a suspect in Chicago who was taken to Michigan 
for trial. The Court upheld the conviction despite the 
defendant's claim that the abduction vitiated the trial court's 
jurisdi~ti0n.l~~ Reliance on Ker and Frisbie would be appro- 
priate if these cases dealt with facts that bore closer resem- 
blance to the Machain incident. As the descriptions noted here- 
in demonstrate, however, the Ker and Frisbie decisions hardly 
prepare treaty parties for a Machain-type scenario. Once con- 
vinced of the mistaken premise that Ker was on point, the 
Court could not get off track, and its conclusion that Ker con- 
trolled became inevitable. 
Parallel and more weighty interpretive aides were avail- 
able in precedents such as United States u. R a ~ s c h e r ' ~ ~  and 
167. Although Ker's custody was initially sought through an extradition treaty 
between the United States and Peru, his abduction by the messenger sent to col- 
lect him was not done under official authority. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 
660. 
168. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 437-38 (1886). 
169. Id. at 441-42. 
170. Id. at 443-44. 
171. 342 U.S. 519 (1952). 
172. Id. at 522. 
173. 119 U.S. 407 (1886). 
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Cook v. United States.174 Rauscher arose under an extradition 
treaty between the United States and Great Britain, and raised 
the issue whether a defendant may be tried for a crime other 
than the one for which he was e~tradited.'?~ Interpreting the 
treaty as the exclusive mechanism for obtaining jurisdiction 
over someone within Britain's territorial boundaries, the Court 
held that Rauscher, the defendant, could only be tried for the 
extradited offense, murder.176 Coincidentally, the Court in 
Rauscher pointed to the specificity of the treaty language, its 
procedural mechanism, evidentiary requirements, and purpose 
to support its territorial interpretation.ln The treaty's silence 
on the jurisdictional authority of the receiving state was not a 
hindrance to this construction.178 Unlike the decision in 
Machain, the decision in Rauscher stuck to text and did not 
treat silence on the contested issue as a broad jurisdictional 
grant. 
Curiously, the Machain Court decided that the application 
of Rauscher would be a great "inferential leap, with only the 
most general of international law principles to support it. "I7' 
The glaring similarities in text and context of the two treaties, 
however, command similar construction, even in the absence of 
supporting principles of international law. In fact, international 
law can only reinforce construction of the U.S.-Mexico extradi- 
tion treaty as condemning abductions that violate a nation's 
territorial integrity. 
Cook v. United States, another neglected precedent, also 
involved a treaty between the United States and Great Brit- 
ain.lgO This treaty regulated the importation of alcoholic bev- 
erages into the United States during prohibition.lgl In Cook, 
174. 288 U.S. 102 (1933). 
175. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 409 (1886). The treaty limitation 
on crimes for which the extradited defendant may be prosecuted is known as the 
doctrine of specialty. Id. a t  411. Specialty claims are apparently the most common- 
ly alleged treaty violations. For a discussion of the doctrine and arguments favor- 
ing a grant of standing to defendants to make specialty claims, see Kenneth E. 
Levitt, Note, International Extradition, the Principle of Specialty, and Effective 
Treaty Enforcement, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1017 (1992). 
176. Rauscher, 119 U.S. at  430. 
177. See id. a t  423. 
178. In fact, Britain remained silent on Raucher's conviction but the Court 
nonetheless presumed an objection. 
179. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at  669. 
180. Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors, May 22, 
1924, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 43 Stat. 1761. 
181. See id. art. 11, $8 1-3. The relevant sections provided: 
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a British vessel was boarded off the Massachusetts coast and 
alcoholic beverages were found in violation of the treaty.lg2 A 
penalty was assessed, and the vessel and cargo were seized by 
the Collector of Customs to secure payment.lg3 It was deter- 
mined that the boarding and seizure occurred outside the 
boundary set by the treaty? As in Machain, the government 
argued that Ker contr01led.l~~ The Court rejected this argu- 
ment, noting that the boarding and seizure were acts of the 
government, not of private individuals as in Ker.lg6 Relying 
on the treaty language, the Court found a specific territorial 
limitation on government conduct and regarded the treaty as  
the exclusive mechanism by which vessels could be boarded 
and ~eized."~ In giving primacy to the treaty terms, the 
Court ruled that the United States was obliged to fulfill the 
terms of the treaty by respecting its limitations. In effect, the 
Court held that the agreed upon rules for boarding and seizure 
had to be complied with before the adjudicatory powers of the 
(1) His Britannic Majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the 
boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of 
territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories or 
possessions in order that enquiries may be addressed to those on board 
and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of as- 
certaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import 
or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories 
or possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such enquiries 
and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the 
vessel may be instituted. 
(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has commit- 
ted or is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws 
of the United States, its territories or possessions prohibiting the importa- 
tion of alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a 
port of the United States, its territories or possessions for adjudication in 
accordance with such laws. 
(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at  a 
greater distance from the coast of the United States its territories or 
possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of 
endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor 
is intended to be conveyed to the United States its territories or posses- 
sions by a vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be 
the speed of such other vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded, 
which shall determine the distance from the coast at  which the right 
under this article can be exercised. 
182. Cook, 288 U.S. at  107-08. 
183. Id. at  108. 
184. Id. at 107, 110. 
185. See id. at  120-21. 
186. Id. at  121-22. 
187. Id. at  120-22. 
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Court could be legal and binding. The Court confirmed its con- 
clusion with a reference to the treaty's purpose.'88 
C. The Weight Assigned International Law 
An attempt was made to bootstrap customary international 
law to the treaty terms thereby establishing an implied prohi- 
bition of abductions. Specifically, Machain argued that the 
condemnation of abduction by customary international law, the 
United Nations Charter, and the Charter of the Organization of 
American States supported an interpretation that would deny 
jurisdiction to the courts of the abducting country. Machain's 
argument was couched in terms of an "implied" right so widely 
recognized that its inclusion in the treaty was unnece~sary.'~~ 
The Court rejected the implied prohibition interpretation 
as a great "inferential leap" that "goes beyond established pre- 
cedent and pra~tice." '~~ The Court reasoned that, in the past, 
customary international rules had informed its interpretive 
work because those rules specifically addressed the treaty is- 
sues in que~tion.'~' However, in this case, the international 
principle relied on was only a general proscription that govern- 
ments should not exercise their police power in each other's 
territory and not a specific prohibition against government 
sponsored abductions. Instead of using this principle as rele- 
vant contextual data, the Court reverted to its general conclu- 
sion that, regardless of whether Machain's abduction violated 
international law principles, it did not violate the treaty. 
By using hypertechnical distinctions between general and 
specific international law principles, and by evading the contex- 
tual importance of these principles, the Court thus forged its 
conclusion that the treaty had not been violated. The Court's 
refusal to give international law principles some weight belies 
its suggestion that citations to international law that were "on 
point" would have changed the Court's interpretive course. In 
fact, the Court could have fairly concluded that widespread 
international condemnation of abductions is specific enough to 
support this principle's incorporation into the extradition trea- 
188. Id. at 120. 
189. Alvarez-Machain, 504 US. at 666. 
190. Id. at 669. 
191. Id. at 667-68. As an example, the Court cited its Rauscher decision where 
the Court interpreted the Webster-Ashburton treaty as impliedly incorporating the 
doctrine of specialty. 
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ty. Instead, the Court assigned no value to this important con- 
textual principle. 
D. Interpretations Offered by Other Nation States 
The United States is party to over one hundred extradition 
treaties with other nation-states.lg2 None of these treaties 
contains a provision prohibiting Machain-type abductions.lg3 
Other countries' interest in the Court's ruling was therefore 
high. Both Mexico and Canada filed amicus briefs arguing that 
the abduction violated the treaty. Mexico explained that it 
interpreted the treaty as "govern[ing] comprehensively the 
delivery of all persons for trial in the requesting state 'for an 
offense committed outside the territory of the requesting par- 
ty.'"'" Canada similarly argued that it interpreted and re- 
garded its extradition treaty as "'the exclusive means for a re- 
questing government to obtain . . . [the] removal' of a person 
from its territory, unless a Nation otherwise gives its con- 
sent ."Ig5 
This unusual input and guidance from foreign nations 
largely went unnoticed, however. In fact, the Court did not 
even use the interpretations proffered by Mexico and Canada 
as contextual data to determine the contracting nations' intent. 
The fact that international response consistently opposed the 
abduction on legal grounds should have increased the contextu- 
al value of the interpretations offered by Canada and Mexico. 
In fact, it should have been conclusive evidence of what other 
nations intended when they agreed on similar extradition trea- 
ty terms with the United States. 
E. Ignoring Foreign Protest l Interpretation 
The Court's demurrer to the foreign amici in Alvarez- 
Machain spotlights the Court's aloofness to purely foreign 
views and critique. The Court's sense of accountability, and its 
concerns about judicial integrity, is at  its lowest when essen- 
tially "outsiders" are protesting. The reason for this goes be- 
yond the fact that foreigners have another forum in which to 
192. See Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INTI L. 746, 748 (1992). 
193. Id. at 747. 
194. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 675 11.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quot- 
ing Brief for United Mexican States as Amicus Curie, at 6). 
195. Id. (quoting brief for government of Canada as Amicus Curiae, at 4). 
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resolve the general question.lg6 The dispositive reason in 
Alvarez-Machain was that Machain did not have and could not 
marshal1 domestic popular support for his cause. In a public 
sense, his case boiled down to that of a foreigner, criminally 
accused of harming an American law enforcement officer. 
Viewed in this narrow light, Machain's protest lacked the mass 
appeal or the human dimensions that the interdicted Haitian 
refugees presented. 
In addition, foreign amici were both pitted against an exec- 
utive slated in advance to win by the Court's rule of deference 
and lacked an ally in any of the branches of government. At 
the political and popular level, the executive's case was strong 
because drugs and drug-related crimes are national problems 
and priorities. The President thus had no reason to fear voter 
backlash, and in fact may have received political mileage in 
backing the abduction. Congress certainly had no stake in 
pursuing a matter for which there was no real domestic constit- 
uency, and the Supreme Court as public opinion pollster was 
quite in tune with public sentiment. From the Court's vantage 
point, this was not a truly American issue that would stick in 
the minds of the American public. 
When foreign amici show up alone, they represent the 
weakest check on the Court's institutional accountability. With 
such protests, the Court generally need not worry about dem- 
onstrations in the street or popular domestic outcry that may 
translate into congressional or Executive reaction against the 
Court's actions. The Court therefore indulges in complete dis- 
cretion when selecting forms of construction, interpretation, 
and argument to formulate its positions. 
Because national interest is a stronger force than interna- 
tional law or principles, the Supreme Court will not likely 
change its deferential attitude to the executive when interpret- 
ing treaties. Foreign critics have nothing to bargain with when 
asking the Court to adopt their interpretations. As the purely 
foreign protest experience shows, offering sound construction 
and labeling the Court unprincipled do not change the Court's 
interpretive course. Securing domestic support improves the 
196. In Alvarez-Machain, for example, the Court directed the Mexican amicus 
to the executive branch. See Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 669. 
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chance of influencing the Court. As the Haitian refugee cases 
demonstrate, however, this can be weakened by conflicting 
domestic views and politics. Further, the frustrations experi- 
enced by purely domestic protestors is a constant reminder that 
even "in-house" protestors are not consistent in achieving influ- 
ence with the Court. And while accusations of dishonesty may 
be academically therapeutic, they make no progress in chang- 
ing the Court's interpretive course. Foreign amici are therefore 
doomed to a response of indifference until they devise an inter- 
nal check of the type available to domestic amici. But as the 
statutory interpretation cases show, even internal checks have 
their limitations. For example, even if protests of the type used 
in Patterson were to result in amendments to a statute, the 
Court remains free to interpret those amendments in a way 
that limits the intent and desires of popular and congressional 
protestors. As such, any mechanism, short of waiting for the 
Court to adopt international norms would be beneficial. 
